Satellite imagery from August 28, 2022, shows that the deck now connects to the southern shore and that workers are making progress on the roads connecting both sides of the bridge. In March 2022, CSIS published satellite imagery and analysis of the bridge, which showed that workers had nearly connected its deck from the northern shore to the southern shore. Construction work has also begun on the foundation of an additional structure nearby, which could be barracks or an operations facility to support the existing facility, or it could be another radome facility altogether.įinally, 10 km east of the new radome site and 23 km from the LAC, construction work continues on a bridge that will significantly improve the PLA’s ability to move troops and equipment across the lake. Satellite imagery from October 4, 2022, shows that the site now consists of a radome, two tall high-frequency radio or microwave towers, and a support building. Construction of the facility itself began in late 2021. Initial work on the new radome facility kicked off in August 2021 with the construction of roads and supporting infrastructure. It is unclear what is inside the protective radome, but given its location and setup, the PLA could employ it for signals intelligence (SIGINT) collection, satellite communications, or radar. This new radome supplements another radome site that was constructed directly on the banks of Pangong Tso sometime before 2016. Approximately six km east of the headquarters facility, a new radome is being constructed on a mountain peak north of the lake. The APCs and other vehicles stationed there could rush troops to key locations along the lake and the facility’s howitzers and air defense weapons could be called upon to hold or advance PLA positions. The facility’s considerable armament of equipment and weaponry could prove critical in a future skirmish or conflict with India. It serves as a new node connecting troops at Pangong Tso with military authorities elsewhere in the PLA Western Theater Command, which is headquartered thousands of kilometers away and is responsible for military operations on China’s western frontiers.
Line of actual control upgrade#
This facility represents a considerable upgrade in the PLA’s presence in one of the most remote and inhospitable spots on the globe.
Line of actual control full#
The northern portion shows a full company of armored personnel carriers (APCs), as well as vehicle shelters and additional weapons positions.
On the south side are numerous shelters for weapons-likely artillery and anti-aircraft systems. At its center are headquarters and support buildings, which are flanked by a bevy of trenches and revetments for storing and securing equipment. Satellite imagery from October 4, 2022, shows that work is completed and that the site now boasts a significant PLA presence. This new facility then continually expanded and developed throughout much of 2021. Chinese troops originally set up a camp at the site in May 2020 before razing and replacing it with a more permanent fixture in June 2020. The headquarters facilities, which are situated on Indian-claimed territory just six km from the LAC, evolved from encampments that popped up amid the 2020 standoff.
Tensions have continued to simmer at Pangong Tso since 2020, and both sides have retained a presence in the area.Īmong the most notable Chinese developments at Pangong Tso are what appear to be new division-level headquarters and garrison that likely support a considerable number of People’s Liberation Army (PLA) troops stationed around the lake. The fighting resulted in dozens of casualties and was soon followed by deadly clashes in the nearby Galwan Valley-the first combat deaths along the border since a major border conflict in 1967. Pangong Tso leapt to the foreground of China-India tensions in May 2020, when intense clashes erupted there between troops along the LAC. In fact, satellite imagery reveals that China is investing in a significant, long-term military presence near Pangong Tso, a remote lake that straddles the LAC just 50 kilometers south of the Gogra Hot Springs. Yet neither side is engaging in a broader pullback. In September 2022, the two regional powers mutually began to move their troops back from key positions along the hotly contested Line of Actual Control (LAC) near the Gogra Hot Springs. Bermudez Jr., and Jennifer JunĬhina’s recent willingness to tamp down tensions with India at their disputed Himalayan border belies Beijing’s broader strategic ambitions in the region.
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